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Abstract 
 
When developers gain thorough understanding and 
knowledge of software security, they can produce more 
secure software. This study aims at empirically 
identifying and understanding the security issues 
posted on a random sample of GitHub repositories. We 
tried to understand the presence of security issues and 
their key themes and topics. We applied a mixed-
methods approach, combining topic modeling 
techniques and qualitative analysis. Our findings have 
revealed that a) the rate of security-related issues was 
rather small (approx. 3% of all issues), b) the majority 
of the security issues were related to identity 
management and cryptography topics. We present 7 
high-level themes of problems that developers face in 
implementing security features.  
 
 
1. Introduction  
 
With a growth in connectivity of systems and 
services to the Internet, security of software systems is 
increasingly becoming important. Security 
vulnerabilities can expose a system to attackers for 
stealing sensitive data and performing malicious 
activities that sometimes have tremendous impact. The 
most recent example is the “WannaCry” attack in May 
2017, which targeted more than 90 countries and 
infected internal systems of organizations, e.g., 
hospitals in the UK. Therefore, different security 
mechanisms, guidelines and tools are continuously 
being provided with the purpose of decreasing software 
security risks. It is found that scarcity of security 
professionals and developers’ lack of knowledge of 
secure coding are major concerns particularly for web 
app development [1]. This motivates researchers (e.g., 
[2]) to investigate solutions to improve security skills 
of developers. The lack of security professionals can be 
due to ineffective methods (e.g., relying on 
apprenticeship) that are normally used for sharing 
security knowledge [3]. As a result, some initiatives 
(e.g., [3], [4]) are taken to systematically organize 
software security knowledge to be used by researchers 
and practitioners in this domain. There also exist well-
known security dictionaries and catalogues (e.g., 
Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures - CVE) that 
are maintained with categorized information about 
vulnerabilities. Despite their popularity, these 
catalogues typically have a very complicated structure 
that makes them difficult to use.  
In this paper, we explore the presence and key 
themes of security issues in GitHub repositories. We 
define a “security issue” as: a posted issue on GitHub 
that contains a security-related aspect. Taking a 
bottom-up approach, we aim to understand security-
related topics and themes emerging from issues that 
software developers raised. We discuss that this tactic 
could help us realize the difficulties that developers 
face in this regard and identify the required knowledge 
areas. Our study aimed at exploring the following 
research questions: 
RQ1: What is the rate of security issues posted in 
open source projects? 
RQ2: What are the most frequent security 
keywords appearing in the issues of open source 
projects? 
RQ3: What are the main themes and topics of 
security issues in open source projects? 
We used a mixed-methods approach, combining 
topic modeling and qualitative analysis to answer our 
research questions. We collected the issues from 200 
randomly sampled GitHub repositories and used them 
as data corpus. Our findings demonstrate that: (1) 
Approximately 3% of all issues were identified as 
security-related. (2) The most frequent security 
keywords found in the issues include: login, hash, 
password, inject, authentic, crypt, cookie, credential 
and certificate, among which “login” was dominantly 
used. (3) We identified 26 security-related topics 
across the issues that were mainly related to identity 
management and cryptography problems. Our 
qualitative analysis revealed 7 high-level themes and 
key points indicating the problems that developers face 
when implementing security features.  
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2. Related work  
 
Software security focuses on developing secure 
software by ensuring security through design, proper 
testing, and educating developers and users on security 
techniques [5]. It differs from application security that 
protects software after development. It is discussed that 
operating a secured network is easier and more cost 
effective when running self-protecting software (i.e., 
properly designed and tested from a security 
perspective) [5]. Initiatives (e.g., [3], [4]) are taken by 
researchers to systematically organize security 
knowledge forming the foundation for software 
security. For example, Braun and McGraw [3] suggest 
three categories of security knowledge including 
perspective (e.g., rules and guidelines), diagnostic 
(e.g., vulnerabilities) and historical (e.g., historical 
risks), and they discuss their applications through the 
software development lifecycle. 
The popularity of open-source software and the 
availability of big open data, motivated several 
researchers to use this data for software security 
purposes. For example, researchers commonly use 
open-source applications for evaluating static analysis 
tools that examine program source code for 
vulnerabilities (e.g., [6]). Open source applications 
have been also analyzed for relating architectural 
tactics to common vulnerabilities [7] and 
recommending tactics for security [8].  
Pletea et al. [9] present sentiment analysis of 
security-related discussions on GitHub. Having 
analyzed 90 GitHub repositories, the authors conclude 
that 10% of the discussions were security-related, and 
they also involved negative emotions. We build on this 
work and use the proposed security keywords for 
exploring security issues on GitHub. However, our 
study differs from [9] in several aspects: a) we use a 
different dataset including 200 randomly sampled 
GitHub repositories, b)  we analyze issues rather than 
comments on commits/pull requests, c) we particularly 
investigate security themes and topics emerged from 
posted issues. 
 
3. Research method  
 
This section describes the research methods used 
for conducting our study. We elaborate on the 
characteristics of our data corpus and analysis 
methods. We used topic modeling as well as qualitative 
analysis. Topic modeling was applied to the whole data 
corpus to extract key security topics at an abstract 
level. We complemented the results of topic modeling 
through qualitative analysis of a subset of security 
issues. 
3.1. Dataset  
 
We used GitHub as the main source of data. Using 
a crawling application, we collected issues from 200 
randomly selected GitHub repositories1. All the 
repositories had at least 500 commits and at least 100 
pull requests or issues. This strategy was taken to 
ensure that the data could provide an overview of the 
prevalence of security issues on GitHub, and only 
active GitHub projects were part of the sample. The 
most common programming languages in our sample 
were the same as in all of GitHub2. We organized all 
the issues in a single CSV (comma-separated values) 
file. For each issue, we included related information 
such as: name of the repository, title and body of the 
issue, timestamp of posting the issue and the issue 
status (open/closed). In addition, each issue was 
examined to determine whether it was security related. 
For this purpose, we used the set of security keywords 
provided by [9]. We marked an issue as security-
related, if it (title or body) contained any of the security 
keywords. We initially ran a pilot study and manually 
verified the relevancy of 50 issues, which were 
automatically marked as security related. This phase 
helped us to ensure all the required constraints (e.g., 
when looking for 3-character terms) are in place as 
suggested by [9], and decrease the rate of false 
positives. 
 
3.2. Topic modeling 
 
Topic modeling is a Natural Language Processing 
(NLP) technique to automatically extract topics out of 
a corpus of textual data [10]. A topic refers to a 
collection of words that frequently co-occurred in the 
analyzed documents, and they are often semantically 
interrelated [10], [11]. Analyzing a data corpus through 
topic modeling enables a researcher to organize data in 
the form of semantic structure without pre-assumed 
knowledge about the content [10]. Latent Dirichlet 
Allocation (LDA) [11] is a popular topic modeling 
technique, which is commonly used by researchers for 
mining software repositories [10]. The LDA model 
provides flexibility in topic modeling by providing 
possibilities to treat: a) a document as a member of 
multiple topics and, b) a topic as a mixture of words 
that could belong to multiple topics [11]. Applying 
topic models, a data corpus could be categorized into a 
different number of topics (i.e., called k-value), 
varying from a few (e.g., k=4) to several (e.g., k=100) 
topics. Yet, it is a researcher’s job to choose an 
appropriate k-value that can represent the number of 
                                                
1 Selected Repos listed at: http://tinyurl.com/SecurityIssuesProjects.  
2 https://octoverse.github.com 
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key topics of a corpus. We decided to use topic models 
based on the LDA technique due to its flexibility and 
proven suitability in mining software repositories [10]. 
We performed our analysis using well-known R 
libraries that support text mining, particularly the 
“topicmodels” [12], “tm” [13], [14] and “ldatuning” 
packages, and consulting with related materials 
provided by [15]. Topic modeling was applied to the 
security issues retrieved from all 200 repositories. To 
do so, we chose the issues from our dataset, which 
were marked as security-related (i.e., containing any of 
the security keywords). 
 
3.2.1. Pre-processing steps. Before applying topic 
modeling, it is required to clean the data through pre-
processing steps. We performed the following 
activities: 
• Removing code snippets from the content of issues 
using regular expressions. 
• Removing irrelevant words using “stop-words”: We 
used the existing list of stop-words provided in the 
“topicmodels” R package [12]. This list includes 
1000+ common English words designed for 
analyzing natural language texts. Running topic 
modeling and examining the results, we added a few 
more words (e.g., the names of repositories) to the 
list of stop-words.  
• Removing punctuation, numbers and extra white 
space between terms. 
• Transforming all characters to lower-case. 
• The words were transformed into their root. 
Stemming was used to avoid formation of topics 
with various forms of a term (e.g., inject, injection, 
injects, injected, and injecting).   
• Forming documents: In our study, we expected the 
LDA algorithm to treat the issues of each repository 
as a document. This choice was made since treating 
each issue as a separate document would have 
resulted in too many documents with almost no 
content. Thus, all security issues (title and body) of 
each repository were merged together to form a 
single row in the pre-processed data corpus. 
 
3.2.2. Applying topic modeling. We ran the LDA 
algorithm on the pre-processed data using the “LDA()” 
function from the “topicmodels” package. In order to 
tune the input parameter (i.e., number of topics) of the 
LDA model we used the “ldatuning” R package. This 
package facilitates selecting an appropriate k-value for 
a given dataset. It implements and compares the results 
of four different metrics to find the optimal number of 
topics. The implemented metrics are based on 
maximization [16], [17] and minimization [18], [19] 
approaches. A researcher could analyze the extreme 
values of these metrics in order to determine the best 
value for the number of topics. For a detailed 
discussion on implementation and use of these metrics, 
we refer readers to the related references. We have 
examined these metrics for k=5 to k=30. The results 
suggested the best number of topics to be between 
k=17 and k=26. We chose k=26 for our analysis to 
ensure that the entire range of key topics are included. 
Besides, three metrics reached a reasonable value for 
k=26, indicating its appropriateness. 
 
3.3. Qualitative analysis  
 
We qualitatively analyzed a subset of security 
issues retrieved from GitHub repositories. This round 
of analysis was performed to a) verify issues marked as 
security-related, b) investigate the main themes of 
security issues through manual analysis and an in-
depth interpretation. We selected the top 10 
repositories with the highest rate of security issues and 
qualitatively analyzed 234 issues. We performed 
thematic analysis [20] on the content of all security 
issues from the selected repositories. The security 
issues were imported into Nvivo (i.e., a qualitative 
analysis tool) and manually open coded. In Nvivo, the 
issues were organized in form of datasets, i.e. one 
dataset per repository and one row in the dataset per 
issue. This data structure facilitated tracking 
distribution of themes within the repositories and 
issues, and ensuring all the issues being coded. The 
emerging codes were further categorized into themes. 
 
4. Findings  
 
We present our findings to answer the research 
questions of the study. 
 
4.1. Distribution of security issues 
 
We present the general findings from the 
exploration of security issues. Table 1 highlights the 
overview of our dataset. Our dataset included 64,963 
issues posted from Feb 2007 to Aug 2016. Examining 
the issues against the list of security keywords [9], we 
have identified 1,938 security issues (i.e., ~ 3% of all 
the issues). 
Table 1 - Summary of dataset 
# Issues Dates # Security 
Issues 
% Security 
Issues 
64,963 2007/02 - 
2016/08 
1,938 2.98% 
 
We explored the most frequently found security 
keywords. Figure 1 depicts the word cloud of the 
identified security keywords. We observe that “login” 
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Figure 1 - Word cloud of security keywords 
is the most dominant keyword used in the security 
issues, followed by “hash”, “password” and “inject”. 
 
4.2. Security topics  
 
Table 2 shows the 26 topics identified by our topic 
model analysis. For each topic, we have provided the 
top terms of the topic. We have manually assigned 
descriptive labels to each topic based on a combination 
of terms and investigation of the data whenever it was 
required. Topic model analysis suggested several 
topics regarding identity management that contained 
words such as login, password, authent and credent 
among their top-terms. These topics covered a broad 
domain incorporating different 
authentication/authorization mechanisms (e.g., web 
authentication (T2), windows authentication (T13), 
HTTP cookie authentication (T8), certificate 
authentication (T20), user authentication (T5), 
managing user accounts/use of OAuth (T6)), as well as 
feature implementation and configuration supporting 
user credentials (e.g., login implementation in websites  
(T12), password UI features (T9), password 
provisioning and verifications to server (T17)). 
We found several topics related to the concept of 
cryptography and encryption. These topics included 
areas such as: crypto-currency mining (T1), developing 
hash storage functionalities (T3), cryptography 
algorithms (T4), public-key signature system (T25) as 
well as encryption of sensitive data (T15 and T23). The 
topic models suggested 3 topics about injection (i.e., 
T14, T18 and T19). Having investigated the contents 
of these topics, we found that they were not related to 
security (e.g., SQL injection), but about a particular 
design pattern (i.e., dependency injection). There were 
topics from other domains such as media player 
security (T10), game development (T16), certificate 
management (T21) and violation management (T22). 
The combination of top terms appearing in some of the 
topics (i.e., T7, T11, T24, and T26) was too varied and 
did not clearly reflect a concept. While we have given 
labels to these topics based on some of the top terms, 
there is a possibility that they contain other contents.
Table 2 - List of identified topics and top terms 
Id Topic Label Top Terms  Explanation 
T1 Crypto-currency 
mining 
hashrat, pool, login, password, user, 
hash, account, set, network, rate  
Refers to crypto-currency mining and possibly 
managing users (login, password, account) in this 
context.  
T2 Web/LDAP 
Authentication 
login, password, ldap, user, web, 
authent, server, connect, interface, 
log 
Refers to web authentication and possibly relates 
to the use of LDAP for this purpose.  
T3 Hash Storage 
Implementation 
sign, key, hashdict, set, log, modul, 
hashset, creat, compil, iex  
“hashdict”, “hashset” refer to Java classes for 
storing and retrieving data using hash tables. 
Other terms also relate to implementation.  
T4 Cryptography 
Algorithms 
checksum, sha, line, file, encod, 
hash, download, build, time, packag 
Refers to cryptography algorithms (e.g., sha, 
hash). Other terms are more about 
implementation. 
T5 User 
Authentication 
(sessions/cookies) 
login, password, user, cooki, 
authent, session, server, connect, 
set, secur 
Refers to user authentication and possibly use of 
cookies and sessions in this regard. 
T6 Managing User 
Accounts (use of 
OAuth) 
Login, password, user, sign, page, 
server, account, twitter, set, log, 
oauth, facebook, ssl 
Refers to managing user accounts (e.g., user, 
account, login) and possibly the use of the OAuth 
protocol in this regard (e.g., twitter, oauth, 
facebook, ssl). 
T7  
Data Sanitization 
Function, key, origin, report, check, 
sanit, codegoogl, secur, version, 
cba, sign, unsign, regexp 
Combination of terms does not clearly reflect a 
topic. It is partly about data sanitization (e.g., 
sanit, key, origin, sign, unsign, regexp). 
T8 HTTP Cookie 
Authentication 
User, cooki, certif, tenant, sign, 
authent, hash, server, header, 
It is about HTTP cookie authentication (e.g., 
cooki, authent, hash, header, request, respons).  
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request, respons 
T9 Password UI 
Features 
Password, login, user, sign, page, 
email, link, chang, box, send 
Refers to passwords and supporting UI features 
(e.g., chang, box, page). For example, change 
forgotten password. 
T10 Media Player 
Security 
Track, video, add, secur, test, hack, 
url, updat, locat, herm, android 
Refers to security (e.g., secur, hack, test) aspects 
in context of media player (e.g., track, video). 
T11 Server Security 
Configuration 
link, server, login, add, secur, 
Ubuntu, tile, compil, access, trusti, 
instal, fail, test, port, instanc, integr 
Does not clearly reflect a topic. Partly refers to 
server security configuration (e.g., server, login, 
access), likely about integration servers (integr).  
T12 Login 
Implementation in 
Websites 
Login, site, user, jetpack, page, 
form, email, sso, comment, option, 
component 
Refers to login and its implementation in websites 
(e.g., site, jetpack, form). Also, contains SSO (i.e., 
a shared authentication technique). 
T13 Windows 
Authentication 
User, authent, password, window, 
server, header, run, virtuoso, code, 
client, explor, internet, ntlm, kerbero 
Refers to user authentication in Windows-based 
systems (e.g., window, internet, explor, ntlm, 
kerbero). 
T14 Dependency 
Injection 
Implementation - 1 
Inject, compon, servic, href, chang, 
test, creat, code, call, url  
Refers to the dependency injection design pattern. 
Not related to security, as no related word found 
in top terms. 
T15 Cookie Value 
Encryption 
Cooki, decod, encod, data, header, 
yield, string, support, request, handl 
Refers to cookies and encrypting their values 
(e.g., decod, encod).  
T16 Game 
Development 
Security 
Configuration 
Uniti, extra, render, declar, function, 
length, forward, password, line, add, 
signatur 
Refers to development (e.g., function, line) in the 
context of games (e.g., uniti3, render) and covers 
security-related aspects (e.g., password, 
signatur).  
T17 Password 
Provisioning and 
Verification 
Password, inject, user, connect, 
box, vagrant, fail, run, fix, access, 
server, framework, test, violat,  
Refers to providing and verifying passwords to 
servers (e.g., password, access, server, violat). 
E.g., verifying password to connect to server. 
T18 Dependency 
Injection 
Implementation - 2 
Inject, compon, servic, injector, test, 
depend, provid, constructor, 
browser, router 
Refers to the dependency injection design pattern. 
Not related to security, as not related word found 
in top terms. 
T19 Hierarchical 
Dependency 
Injection Support 
Inject, servic, parent, injector, class, 
child, chang, direct, depend, provid 
Refers to the dependency injection design pattern. 
Not relates to security, as no related word found in 
top terms. 
T20 Certificate 
Authentication 
Certif, authent, github, server, 
configur, check, oauth, set, log, ssl 
Refers to certificate authentication (e.g., certif, 
authent, oauth, ssl), which is used to secure 
client-server network connection. 
T21 Certificate 
Management 
Certif, sign, set, credenti, fail, profil, 
cert, run, platform 
Refers to managing certificates (e.g., certif, install, 
run, fail). Could also relate to certificate profiles, 
i.e., used for certificate configuration. 
T22 Violation 
Management 
Violat, tabl, file, page, filter, oauth, 
account, secur, type, url 
Refers to violation management, possibly through 
UI features (e.g., tabl, filter, page). 
T23 User Credentials 
(Encryption) 
Login, password, user, encrypt, 
page, data, system, server, button, 
screen 
Refers to managing user credentials, through 
encryption (e.g., encrypt) and UI (e.g., page, 
scree, button). 
T24 Git Configuration/ 
Spam Issue 
Password, git, login, authent, wallet, 
implement, support, spam, doge, 
block, salt. 
Does not clearly reflect a topic. Partly refers to 
development issues using Git, e.g., git-salt. Also, 
it contains issues about spamming in the context 
of crypto-currency mining (e.g., wallet, doge, 
spam). 
T25 Public-key 
Signature System 
Key, transact, sign, add, signatur, 
credenti, support, creat, code, api 
Refers to a public-key signature system (key, 
transact, signatur) and supporting it in programs 
(e.g., add, support, api). 
T26 Cookie (nonce 
authentication) 
Form, cooki, page, check, fail, 
email, nonc, secur, submit, plugin 
Does not clearly reflect a topic. Partly refers to 
cookie nonce authentication (e.g., cooki, nonce, 
secur, plugin). 
                                                
3 Unity (i.e., stemmed to uniti) is a popular game engine. 
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5. Qualitative results 
 
Topic modeling treats documents as a bag of words 
without understanding the semantic meaning of the 
text. Therefore, we qualitatively analyzed a sample of 
security issues (i.e., from the top 10 repositories with 
the highest rate of security issues) for in-depth 
understanding. Table 3 demonstrates our manual and 
qualitative verification of the main topics that were 
identified using topic modeling. By main topics we 
mean the topics that were assigned to these repositories 
with highest probability. Out of 10 repositories, we 
verified the main topics of 6 repositories as relevant, 3 
repositories partially relevant, and 1 repository 
irrelevant. We observed that the identification of main 
topics by LDA was more accurate for the repositories 
that a) were specialized in a particular domain (e.g., 
cryptography library), b) had larger number of issues 
(i.e., larger data corpus). We found that the allocation 
of T7 (i.e., Data Sanitization) to the contents of a 
repository was irrelevant.
 
Table 3 - Top 10 repos with high rate of security issues – allocated topics vs. manual verification 
Repo  % Sec. 
Issues 
Type/Domain of 
Repository 
Main 
Topic 
Manual Verification  
relevant: ✓ partially relevant:v   irrelevant: ✗   
crypto-js 39.74% Library of cryptography 
algorithms in JavaScript 
T4 ü Majority of issues were about cryptography, 
stating problems (e.g., wrong hash/cipher). 
yourturn 20.69% Frontend console of STUPS 
platform 
T22 ü Majority of issues were about visualization of 
credential violations (e.g., tabular format, 
filtering options). 
waffle 20.41% Windows Authentication 
Framework  
T13 ü Topic relates to type of the repository. Majority 
of issues were about handling protocols (e.g., 
Kerberos, NTLM). 
evenHire 15.38% Web application supporting 
hiring workflow  
T7 ✗      Not related to topic. Most of the issues were 
        about UI-related problems of the login page  
        (e.g., need of password verification text box). 
sigh 13.64% Application for automatically 
handling Provisioning 
Profiles (PP)  
T21 ü Topic relates to type of the repository. Majority 
of issues were about setting up PPs (e.g., 
find/install certificates for PP setup). 
formio 13.64% Form and API engine for 
building server-less data 
management applications 
T5 v Topic is partially related. Most of the issues 
were general authentication/authorization 
issues (e.g., session expiration, not getting 
authorized at server when giving credentials) 
httparty 11.74% Ruby library supporting the 
implementation of web APIs 
and HTTP authentication 
T8 ü Topic is highly related. Majority of issues were 
about authentication varying from 
implementation (e.g., handling authentication 
headers) to vulnerabilities (e.g., improper 
management of cookie values). 
communit
yshare 
11.54% Web application  T2 v Partially related. Majority of issues were about 
web authentication, but mainly UI related 
(e.g., change password). 
webob 11.45% Python library that facilitates 
HTTP authentication 
implementation 
T15 ü Topic is related. Majority of issues were about 
problems in parsing cookie values in HTTP 
header (e.g., issue when ‘ “ ‘ is used). Yet, not 
much about encryption. 
anahita 11.11% Social networking platform T13 v Topic is partially related. The issues were 
about handling authentication headers 
between client/server. Yet, not about 
Windows.  
 
Besides verification of the topics, we identified the 
key themes of security issues. Table 4 summarizes the 
qualitative findings. Our analysis revealed that the 
majority of security issues were about the problems 
that developers face when implementing security 
features (i.e., 201 out of 234). The remaining issues 
were either not security-related or not understandable. 
We did not find any issue reporting critical security 
threats or vulnerabilities (e.g., XSS and SQL injection). 
As it can be seen in Table 4, we have classified the 
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issues about implementing security features under 
high-level categories including: 1) 
authentication/authorization issues, (2) cryptography 
issues, (3) handling security protocols/standards, (4) UI 
features, (5) error-exception handling, (6) managing 
cookie values/HTTP headers, and (7) others. 
Our analysis revealed 29 issues related to 
authentication/authorization concepts with the key 
themes that are specified in the table. Most of the 
issues in this category were related to implementing 
shared authentication/authorization mechanisms (i.e., 
OAuth and SSO). For example, there were issues 
indicating OAuth configuration problems, need of 
managing flow of OAuth 2.0 tokens in the application 
and SSO failure in the applications. The other common 
issues in this category were about handling 
authentication headers (e.g., parsing/encoding bugs of 
authentication headers), issues about digest 
authentication (e.g., failure/need of support), and email 
authentication problems (e.g., error in sending 
password to users via email). We found a few issues 
indicating improper implementation of authentication/ 
authorization mechanisms. They include: application 
bugs in showing contents without authentication, 
wrong access control verification, and enabling 
deleted/deactivated users to reset password. 
Under the category of cryptography, we found 58 
issues, all belonging to one repository (i.e., crypto-js). 
This repository is a JavaScript library implementing 
different cryptography algorithms including hashers 
(e.g., MD5) and ciphers (e.g., AES). Most of the issues 
in this category were related to incompatibility of the 
cryptography solutions with different OSs (e.g., iOS, 
Blackberry), programming languages (e.g., C#, PHP) 
and applications (e.g., Browsers, PDF readers). In 
addition, wrong cryptographic output (e.g., hash, 
cipher) and lack of supporting different data types 
(e.g., byte, string, hexadecimal) were frequently 
reported. The rest of the issues indicated performance 
problems, suggestions to improve crypto solutions 
(e.g., adding pubic-key cryptography) and some 
general implementation questions. 
We found 17 issues about handling security 
protocols and standards. These included issues about 
SSL violations (e.g. certificate verification failure on 
Windows using httparty), Kerberos (e.g., small size of 
Kerberos token in waffle), NTLM (e.g., error in 
transmitting NTLM token), SPNEGO (e.g., browser 
error in transmitting SPNEGO authentication data) and 
the Spring framework (e.g., error in using the 
framework in waffle).  
Our analysis revealed 49 issues related to User 
Interface (UI) features with two main themes: 
managing credentials (e.g., login, password) and 
credential violations. 
Table 4 – Issues in developing Sec. features 
 Theme (frequency) # 
Au
th
en
tic
at
ion
/A
ut
ho
riz
at
ion
 Is
su
es
 • Shared Authentication/Authorization 
Mechanisms (OAuth, SSO) (12) 
• Handling Authentication Headers (4) 
• Issues with Email Authentication 
(sending Passwords) (4) 
• Digest Authentication Issues (3) 
• General Inquiries (1) 
• Possibility to reset password for 
deleted/deactivated accounts (1) 
• Showing Content without 
authentication (2) 
• Access control for service provider (1) 
• Putting user in incorrect group with 
wrong access control (1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29 
Cr
yp
to
gr
ap
hy
 Is
su
es
 
• Incompatibility of Cryptographic 
solutions with different platforms (18) 
• Wrong Cryptographic output (e.g. 
hash, cipher) (18) 
• Limitation of Cryptographic solutions 
with data types (11) 
• Additional features to Strengthen 
Cryptographic Solution (5) 
• Performance issues with 
Cryptographic solutions (4) 
• Seeking input to Implement 
Cryptographic Solutions (general 
enquiries) (2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
58 
Ha
nd
lin
g 
Pr
ot
oc
ols
 • SSL Violation issues (6) 
• Kerberos (4) 
• NTLM (3) 
• SPNEGO (3) 
• Spring Security Framework (1) 
 
17 
UI
 
Fe
at
ur
es
 • Managing and Representing 
Credential Violations (37)  
• Managing Credential (e.g. login, 
password) setup (12) 
 
49 
Ex
ce
pt
ion
 
Ha
nd
lin
g 
• Exception in Checking invalid 
credentials (2)  
• Lack of Exception Handling when 
dealing with malformed authorization 
header (1) 
 
 
3 
Co
ok
ies
/H
TT
P 
He
ad
er
s 
 • Issues of Managing Cookies (13) 
• Over-writing default HTTP header 
values (3) 
• Ignoring HTTP cookie values causes 
manipulation of load balancer (1) 
• Mutating cookie-hash in string (1) 
• Over-writing hash header content (1) 
 
 
 
19 
Ot
he
rs
 • Setting up Provisioning Profiles (24) 
• Logging and Showing Access 
Controls (2) 
• Configuring Permissions (1) 
 
 
27 
Total = 201 
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We found several issues about credential setups 
varying from suggestions (e.g., adding login feature, 
reset password, waiting message when loading 
authentication data) to errors (e.g., poorly rendered 
login page with lower resolution/small browser page 
size). The issues about managing credential violations 
were from one repository (i.e., yourturn), which 
provides a front-end console for STUPS4. Given the 
type and domain of the repository, it contained several 
issues about managing and representing credential 
violations (e.g., demonstrating a list of violations in 
tabular format with different filtering options). 
We found 19 issues with regards to handling cookie 
values/HTTP headers. Among them several issues 
were about cookie management varying from handling 
HTTP cookies (e.g., error in setting cookie expiration 
time, error in parsing cookie hash values, error in 
sending cookie value) to same-site cookies (e.g., 
suggestion to support these cookies for preventing XSS 
attacks). Furthermore, we identified a few issues in this 
category indicating implementation faults that could 
expose applications to security threats. For instance, 
we observed bugs that cause over-writing default 
values of cookies passed in HTTP headers. These 
values are important as they are used to identify the 
server to which the HTTP request should be sent. 
Hence, a wrong value could redirect the request to an 
unwanted server or cause unexpected errors. Similarly, 
there was an issue indicating problems in transmitting 
HTTP cookie values that were set and used by a load 
balancer. Some of the load balancers operate with 
cookie-based sessions to ensure an HTTP response gets 
back to the same node that sent a request. Hence, errors 
in maintaining and transmitting these cookies could 
enable an attacker to interfere in the load balancer 
function and manipulate sessions. 
Unexpected errors and failure to handle exceptions 
are counted among the key areas of software security 
problems [21] that could expose a system to security 
risks [22]. We have identified 3 issues related to faults 
in error-exception handling. For example, it was 
required to provide proper exception handling in the 
system when dealing with a malformed authorization 
header. Or, it was necessary to control unexpected 
errors thrown by an authentication framework (i.e., 
waffle) when verifying invalid credentials. 
The rest of the issues were classified as others. This 
category included several issues related to setting up 
Provisioning Profiles (PP), i.e., used to uniquely assign 
a device to an iOS developer for testing apps. These 
issues belonged to one repository (i.e., sigh) that 
automatically configures PPs and included errors (e.g., 
in finding and installing certificates for PPs). In 
                                                
4 STUPS toolsets provide audit-compliant Platform-as-a-Service  
addition, suggestions for logging and representing 
audit information, and general inquiries were included 
in this category. 
 
6. Limitations  
 
We realize that our study is limited to a particular 
population of software repositories that are hosted on 
GitHub and are active (considering number of 
commits, pull requests and issues). Our data provides 
some degree of representativeness due to our attempt 
to not filter repositories based on attributes such as 
type or business domain, yet it does not 
comprehensively include all open source software 
repositories. Furthermore, there are limitations 
associated with the applied analysis methods. We 
identified security issues using a list of security 
keywords proposed by [9]. This approach is associated 
with the risk of including issues that contain keywords 
but are not related to security. We tried to address this 
risk and minimize the rate of false positives by 
performing a pilot study and manually verifying 
selected issues. Whilst this strategy significantly 
helped us to improve our search and identify relevant 
security issues, there is a chance of having false 
positives in the analyzed data. An example of this 
situation is given by issues containing “inject”, which 
were not related to security (e.g., SQL injection) but 
referring to a design pattern (i.e., dependency 
injection). In addition, topic modeling has proved to be 
applicable for analyzing a large corpus of textual data, 
yet it does not always generate sets of terms that are 
associated with analytically determined topics. Hence, 
the assigned topic labels are largely based on 
researchers’ opinions and associated with the risk of 
misinterpretations. We tried to mitigate this risk by 
verifying the identified topics against some of the top 
repositories from which the topics are generated. In 
case of high ambiguity, we manually checked a couple 
of issues from related repositories. Besides, we tried to 
complement the abstract results of topic modeling with 
an in-depth view obtained through qualitatively 
analyzing a sample of around 230 issues. It should be 
noted that qualitative findings are based on analyzing a 
proportion of data that may not be generalizable. 
Lastly, our analysis relies on repository contributors 
who experienced and posted the issues. We did not 
verify the validity of issues against the code. Naturally, 
our results only include security-related issues that are 
known and have been reported.  
 
7. Discussion and conclusion  
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Open source software introduces opportunities as 
well as threats when it comes to system security [23], 
[24]. Availability of the source code helps attackers to 
manipulate software for malicious purposes [23], [24]. 
Conversely, users have more opportunity to increase 
security of open source software by applying different 
techniques (e.g., using auditing tools to automatically 
identify vulnerabilities in the code) [23], [24]. Several 
security researchers have investigated open source 
software repositories for different purposes such as 
evaluating effectiveness of static analysis tools in 
finding buffer-overflow vulnerabilities [25], 
understanding vulnerabilities related to architectural 
tactics [7] and mining emotions around security issues 
[9]. Many of these studies perform code-based analysis 
of open source software for vulnerabilities and security 
tactics. Taking a different approach, in this paper, we 
have analyzed a random sample of open source 
repositories for security issues. We aimed at 
understanding the extent to which security issues are 
posted in open source software repositories, and 
identifying their main topics/themes. Choosing a 
random set of repositories enabled us to investigate the 
prevalence of security-related issues on GitHub. We 
believe that our automatic search could extract any 
type of security issue (e.g., threat, mechanism, and 
standard) posted on the selected repositories, as we 
used a comprehensive list of security keywords for the 
search.  
The findings from our study are two-fold: 
methodological learning and content analysis results.  
Using topic modeling along with qualitative 
analysis enabled us to explore a large corpus of data at 
an abstract level, while getting into depth on a 
relatively smaller proportion of the data. Given our 
experience, topic model analysis is associated with a 
number of challenges such as: difficulties to identify 
the proper number of topics, difficulties in 
interpretation of topics based on the allocated terms. 
Whilst we used a systematic solution for selecting the 
number of topics, we observed that some of the topics 
(e.g., T18, T19) had overlaps and could be merged. In 
addition, the combination of terms in some of the 
topics was quite varied, and did not clearly reflect a 
meaningful concept. Therefore, we assert that topic 
modeling is a useful analytical tool enabling 
researchers to quickly learn about contents of a data 
corpus. Yet, its results are highly abstract, and need to 
be complemented with other analysis methods. When 
we verified the topic modeling against the qualitative 
findings, we observed that topic modeling produced 
more accurate topics when data volume was larger, and 
more specific (e.g., cryptography). We verified most of 
the topics as properly assigned to the repositories, yet 
one topic (i.e., T7) was found irrelevant in the context 
of the assigned repository.  
Our analysis demonstrated that the most frequent 
security keywords used in the issues were login, hash, 
password, inject, authentic, crypt, cookie, credential 
and certificate, among which “login” was dominantly 
used. Applying topic-modeling analysis on the issue 
contents, we found that the majority of the security 
issues were about identity management 
(authentication/authorization/credentials) as well as 
cryptography. Despite frequently finding the “inject” 
keyword and identifying related topics, our 
investigation revealed that these topics mainly referred 
to a popular design pattern (i.e., dependency injection) 
rather than security threat/attacks (e.g., SQL injection). 
Our experience in this regard could be used by other 
researchers who are interested in mining security issues 
using keywords.  
Furthermore, our qualitative findings revealed that 
the majority of analyzed issues were problems that 
developers face when implementing security features. 
We did not find any issue reporting security 
vulnerability or an attack among those issues that we 
manually analyzed. Similarly, topic modeling did not 
reflect well-known vulnerability topics. We argue that 
this might be partly due to the development-centric 
nature of GitHub issues. In fact, we observed that 
GitHub repository owners tend to use issues for 
tracking bugs. They sometimes maintain different 
means (e.g., public mailing list) for discussing other 
matters. There is a chance that critical security 
problems are not posted as GitHub issues. A future 
study could explore other communication channels for 
open repositories for analyzing security problems. In 
addition, we discuss that security vulnerabilities cannot 
be easily encountered without running tests designed 
for this purpose and/or the use of related tools (e.g., 
vulnerability scanners). Besides, identification of 
(critical) security bugs requires security knowledge and 
expertise that might not be in skillsets of the 
developers who contribute to a repository. These might 
also be the reasons for not observing issues reporting 
security threats. Lastly, this observation might be due 
to limitations of our analysis methods. Topic modeling 
tends to reflect topics at an abstract level. It might not 
be effective to extract particular vulnerabilities. While 
the qualitative analysis enabled us getting into depth, 
practically it was not possible to manually analyze all 
the issues.  
 
8. Future work  
 
Our work can be extended from several angles in 
the future. In this study, we explored a sample of 
GitHub repositories from the security perspective. 
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Future studies can explore other open source 
repositories (e.g., on SourceForge, Bitbucket) and 
compare the results. Also, more samples from GitHub 
can be explored longitudinally for potential trends. In 
addition, a future study can explore correlation of 
security issues with characteristics of repositories (e.g., 
programming language, domain, number of lines of 
code, number of contributors). Our work can be 
extended by analyzing a larger pool of data for 
behavioral patterns (e.g., number of comments or 
openness) and possible differences between security 
and non-security issues.  
The security topics and themes that emerged from 
this study can be further explored and structured 
towards areas of knowledge that developers require for 
implementing security features. In this regard, 
comparing our findings with existing security 
classifications (e.g., CVE) is highly considered in the 
future. 
 
 
  
9. References 
 
 
[1] P. Institute., "The State of Mobile Application 
Insecurity.," 2015. 
[2] C. Weir, A. Rashid, and J. Noble, "How to improve 
the security skills of mobile app developers? Comparing and 
contrasting expert views," in Twelfth Symposium on Usable 
Privacy and Security (SOUPS 2016), 2016. 
[3] S. Barnum and G. McGraw, "Knowledge for 
software security," IEEE Security & Privacy, vol. 3, pp. 74-
78, 2005. 
[4] A. Hazeyama, "Survey on body of knowledge 
regarding software security," in Software Engineering, 
Artificial Intelligence, Networking and Parallel & 
Distributed Computing (SNPD), 2012 13th ACIS 
International Conference on, 2012, pp. 536-541. 
[5] G. McGraw, "Software security," IEEE Security & 
Privacy, vol. 2, pp. 80-83, 2004. 
[6] V. B. Livshits and M. S. Lam, "Finding Security 
Vulnerabilities in Java Applications with Static Analysis," in 
Usenix Security, 2005. 
[7] J. C. Santos, A. Peruma, M. Mirakhorli, M. 
Galstery, J. V. Vidal, and A. Sejfia, "Understanding Software 
Vulnerabilities Related to Architectural Security Tactics: An 
Empirical Investigation of Chromium, PHP and 
Thunderbird," in Software Architecture (ICSA), 2017 IEEE 
International Conference on, 2017, pp. 69-78. 
[8] M. Mirakhorli, J. Carvalho, J. Cleland-Huang, and 
P. Mäder, "A domain-centric approach for recommending 
architectural tactics to satisfy quality concerns," in Twin 
Peaks of Requirements and Architecture (TwinPeaks), 2013 
3rd International Workshop on the, 2013, pp. 1-8. 
[9] D. Pletea, B. Vasilescu, and A. Serebrenik, 
"Security and emotion: sentiment analysis of security 
discussions on GitHub," in Proceedings of the 11th Working 
Conference on Mining Software Repositories, 2014, pp. 348-
351. 
[10] T.-H. Chen, S. W. Thomas, and A. E. Hassan, "A 
survey on the use of topic models when mining software 
repositories," Empirical Software Engineering, vol. 21, pp. 
1843-1919, 2016. 
[11] D. M. Blei, A. Y. Ng, and M. I. Jordan, "Latent 
dirichlet allocation," Journal of machine Learning research, 
vol. 3, pp. 993-1022, 2003. 
 
[12] K. Hornik and B. Grün, "topicmodels: An R 
package for fitting topic models," Journal of Statistical 
Software, vol. 40, pp. 1-30, 2011. 
[13] D. Meyer, K. Hornik, and I. Feinerer, "Text mining 
infrastructure in R," Journal of statistical software, vol. 25, 
pp. 1-54, 2008. 
[14] I. Feinerer, "Introduction to the tm Package Text 
Mining in R," ed, 2017. 
[15] J. Silge and D. Robinson, Text Mining with R. 
http://tidytextmining.com: O'Reilly, 2017. 
[16] J. Cao, T. Xia, J. Li, Y. Zhang, and S. Tang, "A 
density-based method for adaptive LDA model selection," 
Neurocomputing, vol. 72, pp. 1775-1781, 2009. 
[17] R. Arun, V. Suresh, C. Veni Madhavan, and M. 
Narasimha Murthy, "On finding the natural number of topics 
with latent dirichlet allocation: Some observations," 
Advances in Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining, pp. 
391-402, 2010. 
[18] T. L. Griffiths and M. Steyvers, "Finding scientific 
topics," Proceedings of the National academy of Sciences, 
vol. 101, pp. 5228-5235, 2004. 
[19] R. Deveaud, E. SanJuan, and P. Bellot, "Accurate 
and effective latent concept modeling for ad hoc information 
retrieval," Document numérique, vol. 17, pp. 61-84, 2014. 
[20] V. Braun and V. Clarke, "Using thematic analysis 
in psychology," Qualitative Research in Psychology, vol. 3, 
2006. 
[21] K. Tsipenyuk, B. Chess, and G. McGraw, "Seven 
pernicious kingdoms: A taxonomy of software security 
errors," IEEE Security and Privacy, 2005. 
[22] M. Howard, D. LeBlanc, and J. Viega, 24 Deadly 
Sins of Software Security - Programming Flaws and How to 
Fix Them, 2010. 
[23] C. Cowan, "Software security for open-source 
systems," IEEE Security & Privacy, vol. 99, pp. 38-45, 2003. 
[24] C. Payne, "On the security of open source 
software," Information systems journal, vol. 12, pp. 61-78, 
2002. 
[25] M. Zitser, R. Lippmann, and T. Leek, "Testing 
static analysis tools using exploitable buffer overflows from 
open source code," in ACM SIGSOFT Software Engineering 
Notes, 2004, pp. 97-106. 
 
Page 5513
